eople are increasingly cooperating to share electronic information and techniques throughout various industries. In healthcare applications, data (a single patient's healthcare history), workflow (procedures carried out on that patient), and logs (a recording of meaningful procedural events) are often distributed among several heterogeneous and autonomous information systems. Different healthcare actors-including general practitioners, hospitals, and hospital departments-administer these information systems, forming disconnected islands of information. Communication and coordination between organizations and among medical team members permits information sharing and distributed decision making. Agent-based techniques 1 often support this communication; modeling application components as somewhat autonomous agents easily reflects healthcare institutions' decentralized networks. The agent approach also naturally extends the notion of encapsulation in systems owned and developed by different authorities.
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eople are increasingly cooperating to share electronic information and techniques throughout various industries. In healthcare applications, data (a single patient's healthcare history), workflow (procedures carried out on that patient), and logs (a recording of meaningful procedural events) are often distributed among several heterogeneous and autonomous information systems. Different healthcare actors-including general practitioners, hospitals, and hospital departments-administer these information systems, forming disconnected islands of information. Communication and coordination between organizations and among medical team members permits information sharing and distributed decision making. Agent-based techniques 1 often support this communication; modeling application components as somewhat autonomous agents easily reflects healthcare institutions' decentralized networks. The agent approach also naturally extends the notion of encapsulation in systems owned and developed by different authorities.
Even with agent technologies, healthcare institutions' distributed nature sometimes hinders patient treatment because a patient's healthcare history and therapy documents are spread across independent institutions. To provide better, user-centered healthcare services, providers must view patient treatment processes and data as a whole. Although agent-based cooperation techniques and standardized electronic healthcare-record exchange techniques support healthcare providers' semantic interoperation, they still must reunify the pieces of different therapies executed at different places. Currently, there are no widely accepted unification methods for patient healthcare records. It's not uncommon for doctors to depend on the patients themselves in order to include data from previous treatments and tests.
Making electronic systems provenance-aware 2 lets users trace how actors reached particular results by identifying the individual and aggregated services that produced a particular output. We need such an integrated view of treatment process execution in healthcare multiagent systems (HC-MAS) to
• analyze distributed healthcare services' performance and • audit systems to assess whether, for a given patient, providers made proper decisions and followed proper procedures.
To achieve this integrated view, we must trace the origins of decisions and processes, the information available at each step, and where that information came from. A piece of data's provenance is primarily concerned with execution steps' causal dependencies, although it might also consider time sequences. Although researchers have developed a provenance architecture for service-oriented systems, 2 as we describe here, making healthcare agent systems provenanceaware requires additional techniques. This is because agents are autonomous actors andunlike in service-oriented systems-healthcare agents can participate in the same process without directly interacting. Here, we describe how we can augment healthcare agents that interact in an ad hoc way to produce-at execution time-an explicit representation of the target process without compromising the original system's privacy protection.
The provenance concept
If we know a particular result's provenance, we can increase patients' trust in HC-MAS results. In fine art, the provenance concept is well known, referring to a work of art's trusted, documented history. 2 We can also apply this concept to the data and information that a computer system generates. In a computer system, a data's provenance is represented by process documentation-that is, suitable documentation of the process that produced the data. This documentation can be detailed or general, complete or partial, and accurate or inaccurate. It can also present conflicting or consensual views of the actors involved. Researchers typically investigate provenance in open, largescale systems that are designed using a serviceoriented approach. 3 For more background on provenance, see the sidebar.
How process documentation works
The Provenance project (www.gridprovenance.org) uses a technology-independent approach to service-oriented architectures (SOAs) and has its formal foundations in asynchronous distributed systems 4 and thecalculus. 5 (The π-calculus is interesting here because of how it defines events that are internal to actors as hidden communications.) In this approach, messages are the only mechanism used to transfer information between actors. The project's approach also lets application developers formally define mappings between Grid applications, Web services, and agent-mediated services and applications. We can therefore regard services as components that take inputs and produce outputs, and compose these services into a process to solve a given problem. In this abstract view, interactions with services-which we view as actors in the process and realize as agents in an HC-MAS-occur using messages that a client constructs in accordance with service interface specifications (agent messages, in the case of an HC-MAS).
The project's approach presents process documentation using a set of p-assertions, which are assertions made by the actors involved in those processes, documenting some process step. Two kinds of p-assertions can capture an explicit description of a process's data flow:
• An interaction p-assertion is an assertion of a message's contents by an actor that has sent or received that message.
• A relationship p-assertion is an assertion about an interaction in which an actor describes how the actor obtained the interaction's output data or message by applying some function to input data or messages from other interactions. 
39
The first investigators to record a piece of data's origin and history called the concept lineage. In the Spatial Data Transfer Standard, 1 lineage was a kind of audit trail that traced each step in sourcing, moving, and processing data. Such a trail typically followed a single data item, a logical data record, or a database or database subset. 2 The first investigations also related lineage to versioning 3 and data warehouses. 4 Later, the Grid Physics Network (Griphyn) project (www. griphyn.org) further explored the provenance concept, extending provenance's application in Grid systems in two respects. First, Griphyn data wasn't necessarily stored in databases and the operations it used to derive data items could be arbitrary computations. Second, the project addressed issues related to the automated generation and scheduling of the computations required to instantiate data products. The Provenance project (see the main article) builds on these concepts to conceive and implement an open, industrial-strength provenance architecture.
To our knowledge, applying provenance techniques to healthcare multiagent systems is novel. In organ allocation management, there are few information and communication technology solutions that powerfully support human-organ allocation and keep records of distributed process executions. In the Eurotransplant system (www.eurotransplant.nl), a central server stores all information, makes all decisions, and records all activity in standard logging systems. Monique Calisti and her colleagues developed a distributed organ-transplantmanagement system (in collaboration with Swisstransplant) that combines agent technology and constraint satisfaction techniques to support decision making in organ transplant centers. 5 The system also stores all activity in standard logging systems.
single actor. In addition, we also use actor state p-assertions-assertions that actors make about their internal state in a specific interaction context.
Four-phase life cycle
The provenance life cycle has four phases. In the first phase, actors create p-assertions that represent their involvement in a computation. In the second phase, they store the p-assertions in a provenance store so that the assertions can be used to reconstitute some data's provenance. (A provenance store is a long-term facility for storing, managing, and providing controlled access to process documentation.) In phase three, once a data item has been computed, users or applications can query the provenance store. At the most basic level, the query's result is the set of p-assertions pertaining to the process that produced the data. More advanced query facilities might return a representation derived from p-assertions that are of interest to the user. In the fourth phase, users manage the provenance store and its contents, including managing subscriptions and relocating content.
To support the provenance architecture, the Provenance Project offers a tool set and a reference implementation of both the provenance store and the client-side libraries that provide connectivity between the actors and the stores.
Provenance benefits
As we describe next, when we transform an MAS into a provenance-aware MAS, the resulting system can produce an explicit, execution-time representation of the distributed processes that occur. Providers can then query and analyze such representations to extract valuable information to perform validation (such as the basis of decisions in a given case) or to use in a system audit over a period of time.
With an HC-MAS, we can record all of a given patient's medical processes and reconstruct the patient's treatment history. Making an HC-MAS provenance-aware gives providers a unified view of a patient's medical record with its provenance, connecting each part of the medical record with realworld processes and the individuals, teams, and units responsible for each piece of data.
The Organ Transplant Management Application
We illustrate how providers can use provenance in an HC-MAS with our agent-mediated Organ Transplant Management Application.
OTMA overview
OTMA aims to speed up the solid-organ allocation process to improve graft survival rates. The system evolved out of the Carrel agent-mediated electronic institution, 6 devel-A g e n t s i n H e a l t h c a r e oped with the help of medical staff and recommendations from hospital administrators. Patient treatment through organ or tissue transplantation is one of the most complex medical processes, for two reasons:
• It's a distributed problem, involving several locations (including the donating hospital, potential recipient hospitals, test laboratories, and organ transplant authorities).
• It involves a wide range of associated processes, rules, and decision making. Figure 1 summarizes the different administrative domains and units that the OTMA system models. Units interact through agents that exchange information and requests through messages. One or more hospital units might be involved in transplant management: the hospital transplant unit, one or several units that provide laboratory tests, and the Electronic Healthcare Record (EHCR) subsystem that manages each institution's healthcare records. The diagram also shows some of the target data stores, including patient records, transplant units, and the Organ Transplant Authority recipient waiting lists. Donating hospitals also keep records of their donations, while recipient hospitals might include donation information in the recipient's patient record. The OTA also has its own records of each donation, stored case by case.
The OTMA's EHCR subsystem provides the structures to build a full or partial patient healthcare record drawn from any heterogeneous system, provided it follows particular standards. 7 It also uses an authentication service to authorize remote healthcare parties' request messages.
Adapting OTMA for provenance awareness
We faced three challenges in making OTMA provenance-aware:
• Most of the data's provenance wasn't executed computer services but rather realworld decisions and actions carried out by real people.
• A given patient's past treatments in other institutions might be relevant to the current institution's decisions, so the provenance information about current processes should connect to information about previous treatment processes.
• The agent with provenance information knows much more about the patient than any other system agent, so we must mitigate privacy risks.
In OTMA, an agent-mediated service represents each organizational unit. Each unit's staff members can connect to the unit services through graphical user interfaces. OTM services'distributed execution is modeled as interaction between agents and recorded as interaction p-assertions and relationship p-assertions. Because OTM scenario decisions require human decision makers, we record additional actor state p-assertions that contain further information about the reasoning behind a particular decision and, if available, the identities of team members involved in the decision.
To show how OTMA handles provenance, we'll describe how it records a medical decision's provenance. Figure 2a shows a simplified view of part of the donation process. Our example patient has previously consented to donate his organs. Given this, as the patient's health declines, his doctor uses the OTMA system to request the patient's full health record and then to order a serology test to detect viruses-such as HIV, Hepatitis B and C, syphilis, herpes, and Epstein-Barr-that could be passed to the recipient. When the doctor observes brain death, she logs it into the system (along with the report certifying the brain death). Then, once she has obtained all requested data and analysis results, the doctor (or another doctor) makes a decision about the patient's potential as an organ donor. The doctor then justifies the decision in a report. Figure 2a shows the OTMA agents and their interactions for this small scenario. The transplant unit user interface agent passes requests (TU.1, TU.2) to the OTM donor data collector agent, which gets the electronic record from the EHCR (OTM.1, OTM.2).
Sometimes, all or parts of the record are at another institution (HC.1, HC.2). The donor data collector agent also sends the serology test request to the laboratory and receives the result (OTM.4) along with a detailed test report. Reports are also passed in the event of brain-death notification (TU.3) and the final-decision report (TU.5).
Figure 2b graphically represents the provenance-aware OTMA's p-assertions subset for our example scenario. The part of the process that happens in the electronic system is represented by interaction p-assertions (regular boxes) for all interactions (TU.x, OTM.x, and HC.x), and relationship p-assertions ("response to," "caused by," and "based on") that capture dependencies between data. Although what happens in the system parallels realworld events, as we stated earlier, this is insufficient to fully determine a given decision's provenance. We thus connect the electronic process to the real world by adding actor state p-assertions that state
• who logged the system information ("is logged in") and when (not shown), • which reports justify a given system state ("justified by"), • who wrote the reports ("authored by"), and • when the reported action was performed or the decision was taken (not shown).
Execution analysis using provenance documentation
Storing provenance information instead of the more common standard log systems is beneficial because we store the provenance representation such that doctors and auditors can perform complex queries over it. This lets a provenance-aware system extract valuable information to validate steps in a (medical) process or audit the system over time. In additional to periodic audits, transplant coordinators might also need to ask OTMA questions related to either a given patient (donor or recipient) or a given organ's fate:
• Where did the medical information used at each step of the process come from? vide medical data for a decision? • Which medical actor refused to provide medical data for a decision?
To get the answers, transplant coordinators can query the provenance store. The result is a subset of the related process's provenance representation graph. In figure  2 's graph, for example, we can follow the edges from the donation decision p-assertion and determine
• the decision's provenance, • the basis for that decision in some data and test requests, • whether a brain death notification was involved, • who requested the information,
• where the information came from (in some cases, it might come from another hospital's EHCR), and • who authored the justifying reports in the main steps of the process.
In cases such as this, the decision might be based on other institutions' test and treatment data. We must therefore determine how to find, retrieve, and incorporate that data's provenance. If the target institutions also have provenance-aware systems and their provenance stores are connected, we simply match the different p-assertions related to the target patient. Actors can then make passertions that link the separate p-assertion sets to create a larger provenance document providing an integrated view of the patient's healthcare history. The result would link the p-assertions related to patient data hospital B to the existing p-assertions in the donation decision's provenance. Collectively, we can view the p-assertions as describing a distributed process spanning both space and time. Every relationship described is causal-that is, it's a relationship between the cause of something happening and the effect of it happening. Every relationship is therefore also temporal, because causes always come before effects. Furthermore, we can add extra information to provide further detail. For example, an actor might record as a state p-assertion the time shown on the local clock. Together, the processes'structured documentation lets users ask a rich set of questions about what occurred, why, when, and who or what was the actor. In the OTMA system, the target process can be a patient's healthcare history.
Process documentation in provenance-aware HC-MASs
To create an integrated view of a patient's healthcare history, each healthcare institution must create process documentation that contains interaction p-assertions and relationship p-assertions, which link together the process agents' p-assertions. In typical service-oriented applications, p-assertions provide such links using a common identifieran interaction key-for both senders and receivers in an interaction.
If two agents' recorded documentation uses the same interaction key, we know their actions were part of the same process; both are therefore part of the process output's provenance. However, to record p-assertions with the same interaction key, two agents must exchange that key. They must therefore interact electronically.
In a typical business or e-science application, process agents directly interact, exchanging documented messages. In medical processes, however, physicians treating the same patient often have no direct contact. A patient might be treated by one physician, be healthy for a while, and then go to another physician with another disease that might be a consequence of the previous disease. In this case, the physicians have no contact, they don't know each other's identities, and-because privacy issues prevent revealing their identities-the patient's p-assertions can't be automatically linked. In such a case, we say that there is latent interaction between the physician agents. In addition, the patients can't determine the formal link between current and previous treatments, even if they remember something informally.
So, we define two basic process types: strongly connected and weakly connected processes. We view such processes as graphs whose nodes are the activities executed by agents alone and whose arcs are latent or direct agent interactions. In strongly connected processes, the process graph contains only direct interactions. In weakly connected processes, we can cut the process graph into two subgraphs connected by one or more latent interactions. Typically, a patient's full healthcare history is a weakly connected process containing strongly connected subprocesses. Although the OTMA transplant process is strongly connected, it becomes "infected" with latent interactions once we retrieve the patient's EHCR. Figure 3 shows the model of strongly connected processes and their process documentation. Here, we represent physicians as agents 1 and 2, who are the actors of treatment processes (treatmentp) 1 and 2. At some point, agent 1 sends the patient to agent 2 in a documented way. Agents 1 and 2 record the interaction's p-assertions. Because this is a medical application, they don't use a global identifier for a patient in the local system, because someone could use it to determine the patient's identity. Because the agents interact directly and electronically, they agree on an interaction key and both include it in their passertions. The treatment's process documentations are therefore unified, so if some agent queries the process documentation using patient_local_name_1, the provenance system will return all process documentation comprising the patient's provenance.
Documentation of strongly connected processes
Documentation of weakly connected processes
When agents have no direct interactions, creating the process documentation is a bit more complicated. Although the actors, processes, and process documentation in a weakly connected healthcare process are similar to those in figure 3 , no link exists between the p-assertions sets of the processes that different agents executed. If we want to retrieve the patient's complete provenance, we're interested in both sets. Moreover, if agent 2 discovers that treatment process 2 is somehow a consequence of treatment process 1, it still can't find agent 1's relevant p-assertions because neither the processes nor the patient have a common identifier.
If agents interact, the common identifier could be their shared common interaction key. However, an interaction key identifies information flow between two steps and actors in a process; it's an "internal" identifier with no meaning outside the process documentation. And, while it theoretically corresponds to one patient, the system maintains no mapping between an interaction key and any other patient identifier. Finally, while the patient might use a global identifier such as a social security number with each physician, as we noted earlier, privacy reasons prevent its use in process documentation.
The anonymization process
To obtain process documentation for weakly connected processes, we use an intermediate institution at a higher hierarchical level that's in contact with both agents and knows about the patient. In the medical domain, national and international bodies regulate healthcare institutions and provide services that give patients global identifiers, such as a social security number. However, such a global identifier shouldn't be used to document privacy-sensitive medical processes. Regulations mandate data separation, so institutions can't store medical information and personal identification together. Instead, they must use anonymized identifiers. HC-MAS should thus typically include an anonymization service to convert real patient identifiers to anonymized patient identifiers. Figure 4 shows how this method works. First, we determine whether the application has an anonymization service. If not, we introduce one (anon_service in figure 4) .
Second, the anonymization service documents its own processing. So, when it receives a new patient identity, it puts an actor state passertion about that identity into the provenance store. (The provenance store contains only the anonymized identifier, not the global identifier.)
Third, agents notify the anonymization service when they start a new activity with a patient. In figure 4 , when agent 1 starts an activity on the patient, it makes an actor state p-assertion accordingly and notifies the anonymization service. The interaction is recorded in the provenance store with interaction p-assertions on both sides. The anonymization service asserts a relationship p-assertion between the p-assertion related to the anonymized patient identity and the passertion related to interaction between agent 1 and the anonymization service. When agent 2 starts an activity on the patient, it behaves similarly; an indirect link is therefore established between the two agent processes, and we can thereby determine the patient record's complete provenance.
Although, conceptually, the anonymization service is the system's central interaction node, we can maintain scalability. Agents communicate (limited) data to the anonymization service only when they start a new case. The anonymization service creates a new p-assertion for the case. Agents then link further p-assertions to the new p-assertion without communicating with the anonymization service. Furthermore, we can distribute the anonymization service's functionality among the systems of cooperating services, including countries, regions, and insurance companies.
Primary advantages
Besides returning the whole process documentation, our method has two other advantages. First, agents can improve process documentation quality if they discover a relationship in the real processes. They might, for example, find that a patient's current illness is a consequence of a previously undis- covered problem in a previous treatment. In such cases, agents can augment the existing links (which the anonymization service documented) with direct causal relationships. Agents can do this because they can follow the anonymization-service-based links to locate, identify, and link a single patient's relevant p-assertions.
Second, agents can improve their own activity quality using the linked process documentation: when agent 2 executes its treatment process, it can already retrieve agent 1's p-assertions. If the physician knows the details of the patient's previous treatment, he or she might use that information in the current treatment.
Protecting privacy
In healthcare applications, enforceable privacy rules are extremely important. As the Hippocratic oath reflects, protecting a person's health-related data has been important to medical practice from the start. As the health sector's computer use grows dramatically, the industry is striving to establish practical policies to protect patients'medical data. Such separation must ensure that no unauthorized person can connect a patient's identity with his or her medical or genetic data.
In the EHCR and OTMA systems, institutions typically rely on anonymized identifiers to separate identity information and medical data. This anonymized identifier, which is stored with the medical data, is generated from a real patient identifier. If we know the real patient identifier, we can find the corresponding medical data, but we can't use the medical data to find the patient's identity.
When we make agent systems provenance-aware, we introduce an additional data store into the system-the provenance store. There's a conflict between provenance and privacy:
• For provenance, we need as much information as possible about the whole process (who did what and when).
• However, for privacy, we must restrict access to the available information as much as possible to prevent unauthorized users from identifying patients and practitioners.
The provenance-aware OTMA uses two privacy-protection techniques. First, it doesn't store sensitive medical data in the provenance stores. Agents don't need sensitive medical data from the provenance store; they need only references to such data. So, the provenance store contains only the linkage and skeleton of the medical data's provenance. Agents can layer healthcare data on the skeleton as needed by retrieving it from the healthcare information system. Agents retrieve healthcare data via the EHCR subsystem, which is completely subject to EHCR access rules. This approach gives the provenance-aware OTMA the same degree of medical data privacy as the original agent system. Second, the provenance stores use anonymized patient identifiers. It seems logical that, because the provenance store doesn't contain patients' medical information, we could use real patient identifiers. After all, no one can infer medical information about the patient if the information isn't there. However, the very fact that a patient was treated can be sensitive information. Also, referencing the institution where treatment occurred can reveal the type of medical intervention. So, we must at least anonymize patient identity.
Anonymization should be irreversible: no one should be able to determine a patient's real identity from the anonymized identifier. Our method satisfies this requirement. We guarantee anonymization irreversibility by how we organize the data storage. The anonymization service doesn't store a mapping between the real patient identifier and the anonymized one, and it uses its own nontrivial algorithm to compute the anonymized identifier each time it's needed. So, the real identifier and the anonymized identifier aren't stored together anywhere in the system; finding the mapping between the two is impossible without the anonymization service's algorithm.
W
e're building a first demonstrator of the provenance-aware OTMA. We plan to evaluate it with hospital and transplant coordinators in Spain, who will give us feedback on both the final development steps and the application's fine-tuning. We expect our method to improve process documentation by allowing the creation and retrieval of complete processes. This benefit will come through agents improving both their own activities and process documentation quality. 
